Digital Surveillance in Canada 2023

by Dan Fournier, published Wednesday, Dec. 21, 11:26 EST on fournier.substack.com

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Introduction

So interwoven have our lives become with online digital platforms that we sometimes forget just how much of ourselves we willingly share with others, and how much of our personal information gets collected and stockpiled.  

“Surveillance capitalism is an assault on human autonomy,” remarked Shoshana Zuboff in an interview with The Guardian about her book The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power.

“What began as advertising is now a threat to freedom and democracy. [It’s] time to wake up - and fight for a different digital future,” continues the author before delving into how Big Tech firms have taken targeted advertising to much greater heights of digital surveillance and tracking.

Though this book was published back in 2018, its cautioning tale rings even truer as we approach 2023.

The term ‘surveillance capitalism’ implies that that an entire industry has emerged which capitalises on our personal information. As almost everything we now do has migrated online and via the convenience our smartphones, we are unwittingly fueling the Big Brother Beast. 

Not only are private corporations and tech giants using our personal data in all sorts of ways, but governments are also increasingly collecting and using it for all kinds of purposes, including unwelcomed and unauthorised surveillance.

We have observed such violations during the Covid-19 Pandemic with the likes of contact-tracing apps, vaccine passports, ArriveCAN, and unlawful bank account seizures for Canadians who had donated funds to the Truckers Convoy.

Many Canadians found these actions highly invasive and in breach of our Charter rights.

Proposed legislation currently debated in Parliament and in the Senate such as with Bills C-26 (an act related to cyber security) and C-27 (an act about consumer privacy protection and the protection of personal information), are providing rocket fuel in terms of what they may allow governments and even private entities to access, share, and sell with regards to our personal data and online behaviors.

(Mis)use of Technologies in Emergency Responses

“Canada, like many other countries, has become a ‘surveillance society’,” said Wesley Wark, a professor in the University of Ottawa’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs and a long-time scholar of Canadian intelligence agencies. The quote comes from an article titled Surveillance in Canada: Who are the watchers? published back in 2017.

Fast-forward to 2022, this ‘surveillance society’ has metastasised into a much larger enterprise.

Ron Deibert, cybersecurity expert, founder and Director of the University of Toronto's Citizen Lab recently slammed the federal government for refusing to identify the spyware provider used by the  Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), as per a Globe & Mail article.  

At a parliamentary committee hearing, Deibert found the RCMP’s refusal to identify the spyware rather problematic.

Basically, the RCMP was using ODITs, or “On-Device Investigative Tools”, which can covertly gain access to text messages, e-mails, photos and videos stored on a cellphone or other electronic devices, as well as collect audio recordings.

The RCMP pushed back in the hearing stating that such tools are not used for “mass surveillance,” but are limited to targeted uses with judicial authorisation.

Public Safety Minister Marco Mendicino was not forthcoming over the tools use, citing “operational integrity.”

Daniel Therrien, the former federal privacy commissioner, said he was “surprised” by the tool being used by the RCMP and how intrusive it is.

While many would content that such spyware used by law enforcement is not uncommon or unjustified, national security and intelligence expert Michel Juneau-Katsuya raised alarm bells on the potential for their misuse: “Private companies are using this kind of technology far greater and far more than law enforcement.”

This concern was also raised as apparent red flags in Bill C-27, which would allow private companies to easily access, collect, and even share private personal data of Canadian citizens with third parties.

Bill C-26 also poses numerous concerns, as outlined by the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, or CCLA, last September. They stated that it risks undermining privacy rights as well as the principles of accountable governance and judicial due process which are [supposed to be] “the fabric of Canadian democracy.”

Moreover, the CCLA states [emphasis added]:

“Power without accountability for the CSE: The CCSPA would let the Communications Security Establishment — Canada’s signal intelligence and cybersecurity agency — obtain and analyze security-related data from companies that Canadians entrust with their most sensitive personal information. This would include federally-regulated banks and credit unions, telecommunications and energy providers, and even some transit agencies.”

The CCLA further outlines numerous concerns about C-26 and also offers suggestions on how to “fix it.”

A Dec. 15, 2022 International Report: Under Surveillance: (Mis)use of Technologies in Emergency Responses by the CCLA was made available which outlines not only Canadian, but also global (mis)uses of technologies during the Covid-19 Pandemic.

Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA)’s Under Surveillance: (Mis)use of Technologies in Emergency Responses, Global lessons from the Covid-19 pandemic report.

Their Executive Summary outlines five overarching trends of concern:

• Trend 1: The repurposing of existing security measures

• Trend 2: The silencing of civil society

• Trend 3: The risk of abuse of personal data

• Trend 4: The influential role of private companies

• Trend 5: The normalization of surveillance beyond the pandemic

The 28-page report outlines numerous concerns, as categorised above, of which a small sampling appears hereunder:

Expectations and Remedies going into 2023

With the recent G20 joint declaration to which Canada is a signatory, we must not exclude the possibility of what might come out of Article 24, which states [emphasis added for clarity]:

“We acknowledge the importance to counter disinformation campaigns, cyber threats, online abuse, and ensuring security in connectivity infrastructure…We will advance a more inclusive, human-centric, empowering, and sustainable digital transformation.”

In other words, member countries are likely to devise policies and mechanisms to “counter disinformation”, “cyber threats”, and the like.

The World Economic Forum is heavily involved in shaping the narrative and enabling private-sector projects, particularly through its Centre for Cybersecurity.

Some of its key partners include Accenture and the Global Cyber Alliance (GCA) to which the RCMP is a partner.

The CEOs of these tech outfits, Philip Reitinger for CGA, and Julie Sweet for Accenture, are both prominent members of the WEF, with the latter being an agenda contributor and member of its Board of Trustees, on whom Chrystia Freeland also figures.

Though highly influential, these organisations are most cognizant of the fact that many around the world have become more distrustful of governments, particularly since the start of the pandemic.

Edelman Trust Barometer. Graph showing a sharp decline in the Trust of the Tech Sector, 2012-2021. Source: World Economic Forum.

To alleviate these concerns, they have established the Digital Trust Initiative and Framework and embarked on an ambitious project to “rebuild digital trust for a cyber-inclusive future” which include governments and regulators as part of a multistakeholder global community.  

Many worry that such regulatory frameworks could easily be used to eliminate dissenting voices which they would consider as “cyber threats” by ordering Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to remove these “criminal [web]sites.”

Such legislation is currently proposed in Bill C-26 for which the CCLA deems problematic.

Specifically, they are concerned that with section 15 of the amendments to the Act, as the Governor in Council and Minister of Industry would be given the discretion to [emphasis added]:

“prohibit a telecom service provider from providing any service to any specified person (including another telecom provider), or require a telecom provider to suspend service for any amount of time to anyone (again, including another telecom provider). So, in simpler terms, services can be cut off from anyone at any time, if the Minister thinks it’s necessary to prevent a list of threats”

Put simply, this would give a tremendous amount of discretionary power for these government entities to blacklist and censor anyone they deem a threat.

With the Truckers Convoy in 2022, many organisations emerged along with informative websites; such outfits could easily be silenced and censored should Bill C-26 pass as it is currently drafted.

As Bill C-26 and the others mentioned previously have a long way to go before getting through the House and Senate, it remains unclear the extent to which the Canadian online landscape will be monitored and policed. There is also the added worry that private players may inconspicuously continue collect and share private data of individuals.

Therefore, individuals and businesses should be more alert to these realities and try to mitigate them by being more vigilant, privacy-oriented, and questioning what information they should disclose and share with various parties.

Using anti-spyware software and Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) offer increased protections.

Furthermore, better password management, safer web browsing, and smartphone habits, including being more selective when choosing APPs, could also prove useful.

Notes:

This article is also in The Counter Signal.

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